2. Whether the First Term of the Union is the per se Existing Essence

108. If the union is understood in another way, namely that the first term of the union is the very nature per se subsistent in the three persons, then it seems possible that one [created] nature may be assumed by the three by the quasi-medium of the one essence existent in the three, just as one whiteness could be in three bodies if the one surface, on which the whiteness was, existed in three bodies.

109. Now it does seem that the per se existing essence itself could be the proximate term of the union, because the essence does not get being from the persons but it naturally is before it is in the persons and it gives being to the persons; for the nature is of itself a ‘this’ and per se existent, though not incommunicably; and it does seem that incommunicability may not necessarily be the proper reason for terminating the union but rather singular subsistence; but then such a [created] nature would only be a person with its own personhood mediately, because it would not be united to a person first.